1. I would have investigated everything that went wrong to date to assure that I and the organisation have fully understood the physical, human and latent causes to why things went so wrong in the first place. I would have first considered what I did that was wrong and then what else in terms of the organisations involved.
Why? because this 'operational loss' was a significant and major accidental event i.e. a non injury one that by admission and fact that the companies involved HSE matrix and company policy documents clearly states!
i.e. A major accident/incident events that MUST be reported and investigated to understand why, what, when, how things went so wrong.
Where is the report for this events, where is the evidence and findings?
2. vs. What has been given and based on this evident view is that a well that had a 1.2ppg margin in an 8-1/2" hole is virtually un-drillable once you go the next hole and casing sizes. Particularly when one hazards and risks the high geological and formations factors still unknown. If I had engineered the numbers I believe I would have evidently conclude this well was un drillable unless total pressure management was applied.
3. So in my simple reckoning, a MPD solution and controlled pressure management was likely needed throughout every step of the well. This is what should have been planned for. The risks assessed, where a safe solution was not likely feasible for every step of the operation. e.g Trying to trip conventionally.
A different safer and lower risk solution should have been investigated. e.g. Sidetrack from higher up to assure well was testing in an 8-1/2" hole and 7" liner environment.
What is more disturbing is that such a series and sequence of failed events is not seen as safety because that's what it is?. The accident/incident dominoes lining up on this well simply for bigger things to go wrong as we are not seeing this as safety!
How many times are we going to place our ourselves and other people into these situations?
3. We must therefore change.
We need to avoid prescribed solutions without proper diagnosis. Otherwise as in other businesses this is simply malpractice and non safe acts to have been performed. So in response to how to change?
I have attached the approach I would have taken. This method is the 'life changing' opportunity for all of us within well operations.
We start with ourselves and must first always see ourselves as part of the problem. Then with our organisation we try and truly learn from all the little and big things that go wrong.
We must work to conclude the evident truth to the physical, human and latent causes of things that go wrong, without pointing fingers or assigning blame. We learn so we can prevent failure next time. Please read the attachment.
Want to know more about LCA? Then get in touch with Dave at RP2 or myself as we are alliance partners, striving to assure and eliminate well failure through best practices.
Here LCA tops the bill and everyone in well operations at every level in the organisation is encouraged to pursue LCA training to learn from things that go wrong. You start by looking at one's self and asking how did I contribute to this event etc.
So I was part of this problem. I looked at myself and spent a full day making the summary LCA methodology attachment to share.
So that we can all try and learn from things that go wrong, using an introspective approach that starts with one's self.
Dave, assuming there is already a 7" liner set and cemented inside the production casing and you are talking about under-reaming beneath it and you have open hole that could accept the 5" liner, even with hind-sight I may have considered doing what was done already, but instead of cementing conventionally I would have explored options and equipment to reverse cement from above the top of the liner down the annulus, not necessarily on the same trip as running and setting the liner. I may have elected to run the liner without an integral liner top packer and run a separate tie-back packer after the liner hanger was set and cemented.
I'd like to build on the question raised by Noor and the answers provided. Here's the scenario:
The well is an High Pressure, (borderline) High Temperature well. An RCD (Rotating Control Device) was used during this section, at the appropriate moments. The well-test at TD was planned for three separate intervals to be tested.
The 6â…›" hole reached TD. During a post-logging wiper-trip (the well had been open 4-1/2 days), total losses occurred and during the subsequent (and extended) efforts to pump LCM and (eventually) cement plugs, a well control incident ensued. After securing the well (and an unplanned suspension), the cement plug was drilled out in preparation for under-reaming to 7"; the reason for under-reaming was to minimise ECD during cementation of the 5" liner, thus minimising the potential for losses.
During under-reaming, severe losses occurred, which took OEDP and large amounts of LCM to cure. Under-reaming operations then continued.
The 5" liner was run. The hydraulically set liner hanger has a weight-set integral tie-back packer.
Whilst at the previous shoe, circulation was established
without any problems. When approx. 400m off bottom (and 470m into the
open-hole) it was apparent that losses were starting, and when circulation was
attempted there were no returns.
It was decided to run the liner to bottom and continue with the job, but not to set the liner-top packer after the cement job, so as to allow the option of a liner-top squeeze if (as anticipated) severe losses/no-returns were encountered during the cement job.
The liner was run to bottom, hanger set and the cement job conducted with little or no returns throughout.
After pulling the running tools and cleaning out the liner, the CBL indicated little/no cement behind pipe. A liner top squeeze was attempted, but injectivity could not be achieved.
The liner top packer was set (dedicated run) and DST conducted, but no longer on discrete zones (due to lack of zonal isolation).
Our questions are:
We'd value your comments, please.